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Abstract 
 
This paper starts by introducing a tripartite conception of responsibility for health consisting 
of a moral agent having moral responsibilities and being held responsible, that is blamed, for 
failing to meet them and proceeds to a brief discussion of the nature of blame, noting 
difficulties in agency and obligation when the concept is applied to health threatening 
behaviours.  Insights about the obligations that we hold people to and the extent of their 
moral agency are revealed by interrogating our blaming behaviour, and to facilitate this my 
own blaming attitudes and actions are analysed in respect of an imagined adult son who seeks 
thrills by jumping from a pier into the sea, an activity common around coastlines and 
intended to be analogous in varying degrees to a range of health-threatening behaviours. I 
consider my responses to this imagined act in relation to some features of moralism, the 
excess of morality, concluding that blame can be justified when it is proportionate and within 
interpersonal relationships. There is evidence that some nurses hold negative blaming 
attitudes towards groups of patients considered to have caused or contributed to their illness, 
but this is not justified, not only because of impaired agency, but because if there is 
responsibility for health, associated obligations are owed to those who share our lives, and it 
is those people who are entitled to hold individuals responsible.  Nurses who hold negative 
blaming attitudes towards groups of patients are invited to identify the status of moral 
agency, the precise natures of their (failed) obligations and of the patient / nurse relationship. 
It is concluded that reflection on these matters, and the difference between justified blame 
and moralism demonstrates that blaming behaviour in the context of professional health care 
is built on nothing stronger than prejudice. 
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Introduction 
 
The concept of personal responsibility for health forms part of the political and philosophical 
landscape of professional health care, and yet it is poorly understood. Responsibility can be 
presented as a tripartite concept consisting of (1) a moral agent having (2) responsibilities 
understood as obligations and (3) being held responsible for them, that is being blamed in 
failing to meet them (Snelling 2012a). Each of these areas is problematic when the concept 
responsibility is applied to health, specifically to health-effecting behaviours.  Moral agency, 
or at least the capacity for autonomous decision making, is assumed in professional health 
care, and yet is inhibited in much health threatening behaviour not only by so-called 
weakness of will (Kennett 2001) but also by developing insights into behaviour from 
neuroscience and psychology.  Obligations related to health and health related behaviours are 
stated or implied in official documents like the National Health Service (NHS) constitution 
which asks that patients:  
 
Please recognise that you can make a significant contribution to your own, and your 
family’s, good health and wellbeing, and take personal responsibility for it.1 
 
(NHS 2013a, p.11) 
 
This leaves unclear what exactly the ‘significant contribution’ is and what taking personal 
responsibility for it entails. Finally, when we say that we hold someone responsible for 
something, for an action or an omission, what we generally mean is that we blame her for it 
(Smith 2007), but despite being as ‘common as water’ (Sher 2006, p.vii), performing a 
necessary role in our moral experiences, blame is under-examined within professional  health 
care.  Recent events demonstrate that when things go wrong2 nurses, managers and 
politicians are capable of blaming each other and being blamed, but blaming patients for 
causing their illnesses remains outside professional health care, even when outcomes are 
similarly poor.  
 
This paper considers the nature of blame as part of personal responsibility for health.  I will 
begin by briefly discussing the nature of blame and its application to health-effecting 
behaviours where both moral agency and moral obligation are problematic. Despite this, it is 
clear that we do sometimes blame others for behaviour that threatens health, and in order to 
interrogate this I question my own blaming behaviours in the case of my imagined adult son 
who has jumped off a pier into the sea, an activity known as tombstoning and which 
functions as an analogy for other health threatening behaviours. Questioning my own 
intuitions and imagined feelings in this case in relation to some features of moralism, the 
excess of morality, concludes that my blaming practices are proportionate. A discussion of 
the appropriateness of health care institutions and practitioners blaming patients for their 
                                                 
1 The initial version of this clause of the NHS constitution stated that: ‘You should recognise that you can make 
a significant contribution to your own, and your family’s, good health and well-being, and take some personal 
responsibility for it.’ It is interesting because the latter version reduced the normative force of the clause by 
changing the normative ‘should’ to the merely  requesting ‘please’ at the same time as strengthening taking 
responsibility by amending the ambiguous ‘take some personal responsibility’ to the clearer ‘take 
responsibility.’ See Schmidt (2009) on personal responsibility for health and the NHS constitution.  
2 In the UK there has been a series of high profile failures of hospitals followed by investigations inevitably 
leading for public calls for accountability. The Keogh review into the quality of care in 14 hospitals identified as 
a common theme (2013 p.5) ‘the imbalance that exists around the use of transparency for the purpose of 
accountability and blame rather than support and improvement’. See also Cooke (2012) on blame in nursing and 
health care.  
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health threatening behaviour follows. It is noted that Codes of Professional Conduct do not 
permit this, though refraining from blaming patients because of fear of being blamed for 
unprofessional moralism requires an impoverished understanding of compassionate nursing. 
The paper concludes by arguing that a critical reflective analysis of an instinctive and 
emotional blaming attitude, which exists in places within the nursing profession, will 
challenge assumptions that health threatening behaviours are wrong, that patients are always 
fully morally responsible, and that nurses stand in such a relationship to patients that blaming 
is permitted, providing support for regulatory injunctions against blaming patients for their 
choices. 
 
The nature of blame 
 
Though there is a deep and necessary connection between the three constituent parts of 
responsibility, they can to different extents be considered separately. We can conceive of the 
notion of a full moral agent, probably counting ourselves among their number, whilst 
recognising difficulties where moral agency is compromised. We can also make some sense 
of the notion of a health related obligation separate to issues of agency and blame. At a 
simple level, a claim could be advanced that we ought not to smoke cigarettes, that smoking 
is morally wrong. We know what this means and what sorts of arguments are required to 
defend a claim about the moral status of smoking. However, the notion of blame is more 
difficult to conceive of in isolation because we have to blame someone for something in a 
certain manner. It is not so much a unidirectional and rational process from agent through 
(failed) obligation to justified blame, as a complex bidirectional and often emotional 
interaction between the elements. We do not, initially at least, generally consider the extent of 
moral agency and the nature of an unmet obligation in order to arrive at a considered blaming 
regime. When we blame someone we make assumptions about unmet obligations and moral 
agency, apportioning blame to agents as a reaction which can be revised in the light of 
information about agency and intention. 
 
Blame defies simple definition, but can be considered as a range of responses to perceived 
wrongdoing by a responsible agent.  Strawson’s (1962) celebrated paper, Freedom and 
Resentment, developed by many (notably Wallace 1994), conceptualised blame as a range of 
reactive attitudes we feel in response to others’ acts, omissions or character. We feel 
indignant or resentment if someone wrongs us and more objectively we disapprove if the 
wrongdoing does not directly affect us. Martin’s (1991) typology of blame starts with the 
simple judgement blame, the attribution of a morally wrong act to a morally accountable 
agent. Attitude blame consists of negative attitudes and emotions including the sort that 
Strawson described. Martin’s third category is censure blame, constituting acts of ‘public 
criticism…to include all verbal and physical expressions, from snide remarks and hostile 
denunciations to shunning and other body language’ (1991, p.96).  Finally, the fourth 
category is liability blame, involving costs in the form of penalties and punishments.  Care is 
required here not to conflate moral responsibility with other forms of responsibility such as 
contractual responsibility which more clearly assigns penalties and can do so outside any 
notion of moral responsibility.   
 
There are two ideas generally encompassed within understanding of blame (Scanlon 2008): 
assessment and sanction. In Martin’s scheme, judgement and attitude comprise assessment 
and censure and liability comprise sanction. The component parts are variously expressed 
elsewhere though are not exactly coterminous. Coates and Tognazzini (2013) refer to blame 
and expressed blame; or we can refer to an initial backward-looking, emotional or cognitive 
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assessment in contrast to a forward-looking response which follows. Or we can refer to a 
person being blameworthy if we think or believe that he has done a wrong thing that can be 
attributed to him, and blamed if some action on the part of the blamer follows. Linguistic 
confusion is apparent here because on the accounts that I have offered - judgement and 
attitude / censure and liability; blameworthy / blamed; assessment / sanction; blame / 
expressed blame - the word “blame” can mean either or both component parts. For clarity I 
will follow Scanlon’s nomenclature, assessment and sanction.  There are two obvious 
differences in these orientations: control and purpose.  
 
Assessment blame can respond emotionally to what has happened and this part of it at least is 
generally not under conscious control. We feel anger, irritation and resentment, we do not 
think them. It is possible that there is no outward manifestation of these emotional blaming 
reactions, or there may be some unconscious facial grimacing or suchlike which can 
communicate disapproval to the supposed transgressor and everyone else.  In contrast, 
sanction blame takes these assessments and acts upon then them in a variety of ways 
including Martin’s categories, censure and liability. These acts are under conscious control, 
or at least they are more capable of being so than immediate reactions. We choose to 
remonstrate with someone we think has wronged us, or to use this wrong as justification for a 
further act of liability or even retribution. Policies that define sanction blame are considered, 
capable of critique and defence. Some examples of sanction blame, uttering a hasty rebuke to 
someone knocking over a drink, may be more of a reflex action than a considered one, but 
nevertheless this is under conscious control. If instead of remonstrating we were to threaten 
or punch someone who spilt our drink, saying that it was a reflex would certainly not be 
considered sufficient defence in law.   
 
The second difference is purpose. At a general level it is claimed that there is an evolutionary 
purpose for morality (Machery and Mallon 2010), and the reactive responses we feel are part 
of this. As, generally, we care what people think of us, we want to avoid being thought badly 
of and this has a powerful effect on social cohesion, encouraging observation of societal 
norms.  Similarly we want to be thought well of. We may seek to avoid these negative 
assessments but they are confirmed and enhanced by expressions of displeasure, privately or 
in public.  Individual acts of blaming reinforce the sentiments as a forward looking deterrent 
in a number of ways; by persuading the transgressor not to repeat his bad act, and as a 
warning and motivation to others. It is not suggested that all acts of blame are devised and 
undertaken having carefully considered their purpose, but it is possible; and having stated a 
purpose, efficacy can be considered and in some cases evaluated. For example, Callaghan 
(2013, p.39) argues for ‘stigmatization lite’ against obesity as part of a series of measures 
designed to make obesity socially unacceptable, with the aim of reducing its prevalence.  This 
may have some effect on preventing obesity, but it does not appear to have an effect of those 
already obese. Sutin and Terracciano (2013) found that perceptions of discrimination are 
likely to have the opposite effect.3  
 
The relationship between the elements is complex. Strawsonian reactive attitudes or more 
considered judgements of the moral status of an act might be considered prior to and 
necessary for sanction blame, but the component parts do not necessarily have to exist 
together. Negative reactions can be felt or judgement made but a choice can be made not to 
voice them; an agent may be blameworthy but not (outwardly) blamed. Alternatively, acts of 
sanction can be performed in the absence of a reactive emotion or a judgement of 
                                                 
3 See also Schafer and  Ferraro (2011). 
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wrongdoing in pursuit of an overall aim. Having a purpose which can be evaluated tends to a 
utilitarian account of considered blaming behaviour, stated boldly by Smart (1973 p.49-50): 
 
A utilitarian must therefore learn to control his acts of praise and dispraise, thus 
perhaps concealing his approval of an action when he thinks that the expression of 
such approval might have bad effects and perhaps even praising actions of which he 
doesn’t really approve. 
 
On Smart’s thoroughgoing version of utilitarian blame it does not follow from it being right 
to blame someone that that person is blameworthy (Arpaly 2000); and seeking a purpose for 
our blaming actions does not commit us to a thoroughgoing  utilitarian account of blame, 
much less a utilitarian morality.  Blaming someone who is not blameworthy may simply be a 
malicious or self-serving act. 
 
Blame is clearly a phenomenon which is both complex and wide ranging, and yet similar to 
other concepts like responsibility and autonomy it stands in need of an everyday 
understanding because it forms such a central part of moral life. Additionally, within 
professional health care, an understanding of blame is needed if only so it can be avoided.  In 
the literature of health promotion, for example, victim blaming is often raised only so that it 
can be dismissed with no explanation. Downie et al. (1996, p.31) simply state that ‘care 
should be taken to avoid victim blaming’, and Holland (2007) notes that the problem with 
making behaviour modification the focus of health promotion is that it ‘smacks of victim 
blaming’, indicating that even the suggestion of blaming is problematic.  Draft guidance from 
the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) on managing overweight and 
obesity in adults (2013, p.6) recommends that ‘dialogue is respectful and non-blaming.’ 
 
Blame is often paired with what is considered to be its opposite, praise. There are clear 
similarities between processes and elements of praise and blame, but there is no similar 
restriction on praising patients within professional health care. It might be considered that 
since praise and blame both generally follow a process of assessment, that it is the expression 
of blame rather than any notion of moral assessment which is outlawed in health promotion.  
The NICE draft guidance recommends that health professionals be trained to provide ‘support 
and encouragement’ rather than praise, though there is clearly some overlap.  Praise certainly 
does follow from blood donation (Snelling 2012b), and in the UK a nurse4 was recently 
honoured for whistleblowing about poor care, both activities which might be regarded as 
obligatory rather than praiseworthy.  
 
Thus far I have discussed the features of blame rather than its justification. I take it as 
axiomatic that justified sanction blame requires the attribution of a wrong act to a moral 
agent, and so it can be objected to on the grounds that the agent is not morally responsible, or 
that the act or omission is not morally wrong. These conditions are both problematic within 
responsibility for health. 
 
Moral Agency   
 
Unlike the issue of capacity for decision making, which in practical application at least 
requires an binary assessment of capacity, blame depends in varying degrees on moral agency 
with full blame being reserved for those with full agency - that is being fully morally 
                                                 
4 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-25549054  
6 
Who can blame who? 
responsible. We blame people differently, or not at all, depending on their level of agency. A 
nurse in an emergency department assaulted by a person with dementia would regard her 
assailant differently from someone who assaulted her while drunk, differently again from 
someone who was simply impatient or frustrated.  Individuals with dementia are not 
blameworthy, those who are simply frustrated are. Those who are inebriated may not have 
capacity as defined in the Mental Capacity Act but may still be regarded as blameworthy for 
an assault while drunk because they decided to get drunk in the first place5. A person 
confused because of a urinary tract infection may not be blameworthy for an assault, but a 
person with diabetes equally confused because of hypoglycaemia may be to some extent; he 
might have been able and obliged to prevent the hypoglycaemia6.  
 
Attribution of acts to agents can be further reduced in the case of health-effecting behaviours 
in a number of ways. For example, smoking cigarettes is widely acknowledged to be an 
addiction, a state of affairs defined by impaired control (Kranzler and Li 2008) and which 
results in breaking an addiction being widely regarded as praiseworthy.  It could be said of 
course that an individual’s first cigarettes are smoked from choice before the addiction that 
will bind him to his habit takes hold, but in many cases considerable peer and marketing 
pressure influences choice especially in younger people. Some smokers started smoking 
before the dangers were fully known to them.  Similarly, obesity and overeating can be 
characterised as addictive behaviour (Gearhardt et al.  2012). It is clear that it is more 
difficult than might have been expected to attribute agency to behaviour and thence to ill 
health, and that this impedes holding people responsible for their health. 
 
The problems of moral agency extend to all people for all acts. Attribution of responsibility 
for an act to an actor has hitherto been regarded in discussions about free will and 
determinism in terms of whether he could have done otherwise, though the ‘new 
compatiblists’ regard this as the ability to decide on the basis of reasons (Sie and Wouters 
2010).  The continuing position of respecting autonomy as the predominant principle of 
bioethics may need increasingly robust defence in light of the challenges from behavioural, 
cognitive and neurosciences (Sie and Wouters 2010), and the view that, particularly when 
future and current desires are concerned, different versions of autonomy can coexist (Coggon 
2007). That the simplistic image of individuals as free and autonomous choosers is 
increasingly being accepted as questionable is demonstrated by the use of choice architecture 
based on behavioural insight (Cabinet Office 2011, Thaler and Sunstein 2008 ) as well as the 
presentation of health promotion information in a way that does little to facilitate personal 
autonomy, and much to manipulate choice (Snelling 2014). 
 
 
Holding individuals responsible for their health status 
 
To say that we are responsible for our health could be read to imply that health per se is the 
thing that we are responsible for, that we have failed in our responsibility if our health is bad. 
It cannot follow that being well per se is a moral obligation. Likewise, being ill cannot be 
morally forbidden, even if it is considered to be a moral harm, because the range of acts and 
omissions relating to health is not fully determinative of a person’s health status, regardless 
of how health is defined. The famously all-encompassing World Health Organisation (WHO)  
                                                 
5 It could be that the response would be different if it was a dependent rather than an infrequent drinker. 
6 See Rumbold and Wasik (2013), for discussion of a case where a man who managed his diabetes well was 
convicted of causing death by dangerous driving following an unheralded hypoglycaemic episode. Also, 
Rumbold (2013) on the legal defence of automatism.  
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definition that health ‘is a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not 
merely the absence of disease or infirmity’7 is inconsistent with a simplistic version of 
‘personal’ responsibility for health. Not only are many of the determinants of physical and 
mental health (environmental, social, genetic, luck and the availability of good health care) 
outside personal control, but physical and mental health, understood in terms of the absence 
of disease are but one part of health widely conceived following the WHO model or 
something like it. Personal behaviour can contribute to poor health and good health, even on 
the wide model, but not to the extent that discourse on personal responsibility implies; a 
narrower conception which tends to regard health as the absence of disease and personal 
behavioural influences on health as overriding. Under a narrow, disease reducing, life 
lengthening approach, behaviour that threatens health is wrong; under a wider health and 
wellbeing approach it might not be if it contributes to wellbeing in other ways. 
 
Simple binary distinctions nearly always oversimplify but are useful heuristic devices and can 
identify the polar extremes of a continuum whilst acknowledging that the truth (if there can 
be one) lies in between.  But for both positions, the moral appraisal of health-effecting acts 
and omissions is only necessary because they threaten our health. There is little necessarily 
wrong with smoking, for example – it is wrong insofar as it harms others and harms our 
health. It would be unjust to hold someone morally responsible for a state of affairs (poor 
health), unless he is also causally responsible for it. A problem for smoking and drinking 
more than we are told is good for us, is that there is no necessary connection between 
smoking and poor health. This does not deny at a population level a causal relationship 
between smoking and heart disease (which would be foolish given the weight of evidence); 
but at an individual level, smoking is neither necessary nor sufficient condition for (say) 
having a heart attack, much less smoking this or that cigarette. Many smokers die in old age 
having never suffered a heart attack, and many never-smokers suffer heart attacks.  And some 
smokers who have suffered a heart attack would have had one anyway, had they never 
smoked. The heart attack cannot be attributed solely to smoking and hence to the agent. Other 
diseases or disabilities can be attributed to acts or habits more readily, but even here it does 
not follow despite clearer lines of causality that illness-causing behaviour is necessarily 
wrong. It may, for example, have been undertaken in the pursuit of a higher value. A fireman 
burned rescuing someone from a fire would be praised, whereas a smoker similarly injured in 
a fire caused by smoking in bed would be blamed. Smoking or drinking to excess may 
contribute so much to an individual’s conception of his own wellbeing, that he is prepared to 
take the risk of contracting the diseases that his habit may contribute to. 
 
The concept of personal responsibility for health is beset with difficulties and inconsistencies. 
The problems of moral agency, the ambiguous and individual value of health and often 
uncertain causal links between health threatening behaviours and an individual’s poor health 
(narrowly defined), make it difficult to identify each person’s obligations in respect of his 
health. It would be easy to dismiss the very idea that we can be morally responsible for our 
health, and therefore we cannot justly be held responsible for it, but this would negate the 
proven group correlations between behaviour and health, which most people value highly. 
Given the link between a failure to meet an obligation and being blamed for it, one way to 
interrogate the obligations that we have in respect of our health is to examine the way that we 
react to individuals who may have failed in them, that is how we blame them.  
 
 
                                                 
7 For example http://www.who.int/suggestions/faq/en/  
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Methodological and reflective interlude 
 
Philosophy can be seen, by some, as something of a puzzle divorced from personal or 
professional experiences  and the need or desire to change them, and perhaps this is 
especially the case in the philosophy of an essentially practical profession like nursing, whose 
very existence in the academy is questioned (Thompson 2009). Books and papers in 
academic philosophical journals use a variety of methods to link their normative or empirical 
claims to everyday life including testing outcomes of analysis against intuitions. In applied 
analysis, factual claims are often made, as I did at beginning of this paper. Scanlon, for 
example (2008, p.123) states: ‘This account seems to me to fit in with much of what we say 
about blame…’, but it is not always clear what is meant by this sort of statement; whether 
embedded in the ‘we’, is an empirical claim involving more than one person, a few, a 
majority or nearly everyone.  An uncontroversial explanation would be that a claim is being 
made here about plausible rather than actual facts. 
 
Seeking a psychological explanation for blaming behaviour starts by asking not why, but how 
we blame. As Korsgaard (1992) suggests, there does seem to be something unappealing about 
taking the assessment of others as the starting point, but on the reactive attitudes account of 
blame that is exactly what we do. The developing field of experimental philosophy 
(Alexander 2012) offers some insight in establishing how we blame but this does not of 
course settle the question of how we ought to blame.  When presented with an abstract 
scenario presenting information about determinism, people tend towards incompatiblism, a 
position that is reversed when concrete emotional examples are used in experiments (Nicholls 
2011). It is also argued that incompatiblist intuitions are explained by errors in popular 
understanding of what determinism is (Murray and Nahmias 2012), which, when addressed 
result in compatiblist views.8 These experiments concerned causal determinism, more 
complete than the partial determinism influencing health and behaviour. If the philosophical 
work on blame is still in its ‘infancy’ (Coates and Tognazzini 2013, p.3), the issues of free 
will and determinism are less discussed today than in Strawson’s founding essay with 
contemporary work being more inclined to address the psychology and significance of blame 
within moral life (Coates and Tognazzini 2013). 
 
A blameworthy and analogous tombstoning son. 
 
The necessity for blaming judgements forming part of an overall understanding of 
responsibility for health does more than offer an opportunity for introspection, it probably 
requires it, and in pursuit of this I have interrogated my intuition in a case involving health-
effecting behaviour. I imagine that my (adult) son has jumped thirty feet from a pier into the 
sea after enjoying a lunchtime drink. The activity of tombstoning has been subject to 
disapproval and regulation but also has been defended as an enjoyable outdoor activity whose 
risks can be minimised (Snelling 2014). It can be regarded as analogous to the whole range of 
health threatening behaviours that are the standard targets of health promotion and regulation. 
There are similarities and differences between all these activities; in the level of enjoyment, 
addictive nature, the requirements for preparation, whether harm is accumulated or the result 
of a single instance, and the extent of wider societal harms. The discussions about blaming 
my son can be transferred to varying degrees to other sons and daughters, fathers and 
mothers, spouses, friends, neighbours, acquaintances and other individuals more inclined, 
perhaps, to a more sedentary lifestyle, a ‘poor’ diet, ‘excessive’ drinking, and smoking. 
                                                 
8 For an excellent overview of asymmetries in blaming behaviour, see Knobe and Doris (2010). 
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I think that I would feel some disapproving emotions upon hearing of his behaviour, but even 
after detailed consultation with the thesaurus it is difficult to capture what these feeling would 
be. I would feel, I think, disappointment and exasperation, cross and concerned that he has 
put himself at risk. The episode and the provoked emotions seem to fall between the 
categories of reactive attitude given by Strawson.  The harm to me is minimal and there is no 
intent, so resentment seems too strong a response.  But the dispassionate and uninvolved 
disapproval of the objective reaction does not capture the special feelings I would have in 
virtue of the relationship I have with my son, though I may simply disapprove of unknown 
others doing the same thing in another seaside town. There would be a feeling that he had 
done something that was wrong as well as unwise, and of course overwhelming relief that he 
hadn’t been hurt. The next time I saw him I would certainly explain in no uncertain terms 
why I am cross and why he should not repeat it. 
 
What would I feel had he been harmed? The act that provoked my negative reaction is the 
same; what would be extra here is that moral luck would have frowned upon him instead of 
smiled. Now knowing of his injury if I retain the blaming stance (or even if it is deepened) in 
light of the injury would I be blaming the victim? Robbennolt’s (2000) systematic review 
confirmed that we are more likely to apportion blame for the same act when the 
consequences are severe. Thankfully these are imagined reactions, but Sonny Wells’ parents 
had to face this exact issue when their son was paralysed in an accident after jumping from 
Southsea pier into three feet of water. Sonny and his parents made videos after the accident to 
publicise the dangers; his mother spoke of ‘stopping’ (BBC 2011) others from doing what 
Sonny had done, and his father spoke of Sonny’s ‘selfishness’ (BBC 2008a) in seeking his 
post drinking excitement in such a disastrous way.   
 
My instinctive reactions to my imagined tombstoning son suggest that I am blaming him and 
in large measure this guides an account of justified blame consistent with my intuitions. 
Having carefully considered my blaming judgements and sanctions, though not against an 
external and objective measure, I think that my reactions are proportionate. Fairly to blame 
not only requires that the blamed person is a responsible agent, but also that he has failed in 
an obligation, that the blamer stands in an appropriate relationship to the actor and that the 
blame is proportionate. Failure in any of these areas renders the blamer blameworthy, guilty 
of the ‘vice’ of moralism9 (Taylor 2011). 
 
Simply, moralism is the excess of morality.  Like many things which are defined in terms of 
‘excess’ it can be difficult to draw the line, and those on the wrong side of it, or deemed to be 
or accused of being on the wrong side of it may want to redraw the line or even deny that 
there is one. Moralism takes many forms (Driver 2005) some of which apply to the case 
under consideration.  
 
The nature of the obligation 
 
Moralism is overly demanding, regarding the supererogatory as obligatory, the permissible as 
forbidden.  My concern and displeasure upon hearing of my son tombstoning must be based 
on an implicit assumption that the blaming stance that I have taken means that I think that he 
has done something wrong, but it is not immediately clear what it is. Tombstoning (and 
cream cakes and cigarettes and drinking too much) does threaten health but it is also 
                                                 
9 In a similar vein, Watosn (2013) discusses judgmentalism, but points out that nonjudgementalism can be 
considered a vice.  
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undertaken in pursuit of an individual notion of the good life. Or at least I would hope that it 
is. If I found out that my son had jumped just because everyone else had, or just to impress a 
girl or a gang of lads, my reaction would be more severe than had he made a cool calculation 
about the benefits and risks involved. The obligation that I hold him to, and blame him for 
not meeting is one of process rather than outcome (Snelling 2014). In arguing that the moral 
status of tombstoning is not linked to an absolute view that it is wrong I hope to escape the 
charge that I am regarding the sometimes permissible as always forbidden, that I place too 
much emphasis on impersonal and universalisable moral precepts, seeing them away from 
their lived experience. Blaming my son, initially by means of an emotional reaction, invites 
me to reflect upon and assess exactly what it is that he has done wrong. 
 
The nature of the relationship 
 
There appears to be something of a paradox between two positions that are taken to be 
standard in ethical analysis. First that ethics is everyone’s business, that we have at least 
minimal obligations to other people just because they are people. Many health care scandals 
in recent years have arisen and continued because people knew what was happening and yet 
did not intervene10.  Yet, ‘minding our own business’ is widely considered a virtue (Radzik 
2012), and as every parent knows, you admonish other people’s children very rarely and only 
with good reason and great caution. Understanding whether you are situated such that an 
intervention, including taking the public blaming stance is permitted or even obligatory, or an 
act of moralism is an important part of our everyday moral fabric. Partly it is concerned with 
the nature of the act which is objected to; the more serious the moral transgression, the 
stronger the justification or obligation to intervene, but generally this must be tempered by 
the nature of the relationship or the standing that the blamer has to the blamed (Bell 2013; 
Watson 2013). 
 
A full account of friendship or kinship is not required for friends or relatives to understand 
that at least reciprocated emotional ties and feelings allow open moral appraisal that would be 
considered self-righteous undertaken by a stranger or an acquaintance.  Friendship and 
kinship may require the outward expression of such moral appraisal in order to conserve the 
relationship, but repeated blaming behaviour even in the presence of repeated wrongdoing 
would probably threaten it.  We can make sense of general rules and categories of friendships 
but they are best considered unique, such that, as Williams (2013, p. 11) claims: 
 
Both parties must, in order to sustain their relationship, find a mutually agreeable way 
to deal with whatever wrongs one or both of them perceive. […] the standing 
involved is not quite the authority to hold responsible, but rather to share 
responsibility (emphasis in original). 
 
This is not restricted to the wrongs the friends do each other, but also applies to more general 
wrongs. It is significant that Williams suggests that the purpose is sustaining the friendship 
rather than preventing or compensating for a wrong act.  But this may not be possible; 
Scanlon defines blame it in terms of impairment of a relationship: ‘to claim that a person is 
blameworthy for an action is to claim that the action shows something about the agent’s 
attitudes towards others that impairs the relationships that others can have with him.’ 
(Scanlon 2008, p. 128).  
                                                 
10 In the UK, the ‘official’ nursing response to highly visible episodes of very poor care was the  ‘Compassion in 
practice’ strategy which includes 6Cs, including  Courage, [which] enables us to do the right thing for the 
people we care for, to speak up when we have concerns…’ (Cummings and Bennett 2012) 
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The imagined relationship that I have with my adult son is of a different order, though of 
course it need not be. In the case of a strong relationship at least, it is easier to conceive of the 
notion of shared lives and responsibility.  It is not just that the relationship is such that my 
obligations to him would result in my caring for him if he was injured, impeding my ability to 
realise my own life ambitions. It is substantially that emotionally at least, his interests, 
success and pain are shared with me and it is this stake that each of us has in the other’s life 
that partly settles the obligations in the first place and then makes it allowable for each of us 
to hold the other responsible11. Those outside our relationship would need compelling 
justification to blame at all. 
 
The nature and purpose of the blaming behaviour. 
 
Blaming appropriately requires proportionality and consistency12 within if not between 
relationships.  The concern that I would feel would proceed to a stronger and considered 
remonstration that for his sake and mine, that he should not repeat the behaviour unless he 
has undertaken reflective calculations on risk and benefit.  My purpose here is to encourage 
that he make the calculations rather than to prevent him from undertaking the activity. If he 
considers that he has done this it is open for me to disagree and regard him unfavourably as a 
result, but this is likely to represent an attempted imposition of my values upon him, 
something that could be considered moralistic. My expressed crossness as to the wrongness 
of his action and the inadequate reasoning that preceded it seems enough to do what I require 
of it, and I would be justified I think, if I reminded him of his obligations the next time he 
went out on a sunny day. But it probably would not be justified if stronger expressions of 
sanction blame were used – if I used surveillance to monitor his activity, or withheld what 
would normally be his due if he continued, or at the extreme sought to prevent him from 
going out at all or to pick and choose his friends and activities for him. It could be argued that 
some of these actions are not properly regarded as blaming actions, but in any event my 
repeated or prolonged censure or the imposition of strong sanctions in respect of his 
behaviour would probably fail in their intended purpose, and worse, cause such resentment 
that the nature of the relationship would be impaired. I would be blamed, and not only by 
him, for excessive blaming. 
 
If his repeated tombstoning resulted in an injury, my immediate and unreflective emotions 
would probably be similar if not deeper than I would have experienced previously, 
exacerbated no doubt by his failure to heed my pleas. This might extend to unconscious 
expression of this attitude in what would be a highly emotional hospital visit. On reflection, it 
would be clear to me that the considered and expressed blame I previously subjected him to 
has failed, that what I was trying to prevent has materialised and so further sanction blame 
would serve no forward looking purpose in changing my son’s behaviour. It might be argued, 
similarly to Callaghan in relation to obesity, that even though there is no prospect for 
purposeful blaming in this individual case, it nevertheless is justified or required pour 
encourager les autres. In effect this is what Sonny Well’s father did in giving the interview 
cited earlier. The difference is that Callaghan seeks prevention of obesity through individuals 
wishing to avoid stigma, whereas the stated intention of both Sonny and his father is to 
                                                 
11 I don’t claim that the relationship between a father and his adult son is or should be symmetrical. 
12 This is more objective in law in sentencing guidelines with associated appeals by the convicted if the sentence 
is considered too harsh, or by the Attorney General if too lenient.‘The Sentencing Council for England and 
Wales promotes greater consistency in sentencing, whilst maintaining the independence of the judiciary’ 
available at http://sentencingcouncil.judiciary.gov.uk/  
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educate others (BBC 2008b) in the midst of what must have been a devastating and deeply 
emotional time for the family.  
 
The examples of what I regard as justified blame offered in this paper have highlighted that 
unless the moral wrong is severe, blaming attitudes and behaviour are best justified 
proportionately and within interpersonal relationships. Within the criteria identified, some 
variables admit to wide gradation and subjective interpretation, diminishing the prospect of a 
simple and generalised account of justified blame.  Consulting my intuitions in an 
emotionally driven case has helped identify some features of justified blaming which can be 
considered rather than applied elsewhere.  There are analogies to be found between my 
blaming my imagined tombstoning son and the apportion of blame elsewhere, but the 
normative force of comparisons often lies in differences rather than similarities between cases 
(Mertes & Pennings 2010). These differences can only be identified on considered reflection, 
which, it is to be hoped, forms a significant part of professional health care.  What I have 
considered this far is how individuals may be blamed for failures in relation to their 
responsibility for health and I conclude the paper by considering whether the blaming stance 
can legitimately be taken within professional health care. 
 
Blaming and health care practice (i) institutions. 
 
In England it is the NHS, via its constitution, which sets the normative ‘request’ that people 
accept responsibility for their health, and it is implied in policy documents concerning the 
health of the nation and the role that behaviour has upon it.  We can conceive of such a thing 
as institutional blaming, but this is more meaningful in contractual or legal responsibility, as 
this is restricted to considered sanction blame.  The socialised nature of most health care in 
the UK, and the constant pressure placed upon it, means that there are opportunity costs for 
every intervention, so that wasting the time of health care professionals, for example by not 
turning up to an appointment, risks not only poorer health outcomes for the individual but 
also missed opportunities to improve the health of others13.  Fees for cancellation of 
appointments are made in some places14, but generally despite setting the expectation it is 
difficult for the NHS as an institution to hold individuals responsible for their health 
threatening behaviour.   
 
One way in which this could be considered is in institutional policies which exact sanction  
blame, for example in denying treatment to smokers for lung or heart disease on the grounds 
that the patients have caused the disease themselves and so are less entitled than ‘blameless’ 
patients. There is some discussion in the literature about the ethics of denying or de-
prioritising treatment to individuals (normally categorised into groups) deemed to be 
responsible for their poor health15 though currently policy is that this cannot be considered.  
                                                 
13 According to the Health and Social Care Information Centre (2013) there were 6.7 million missed 
appointments in the year to September 2012, representing 7.3% of all appointments. It is claimed that this costs 
hospitals £600 million per year (Dr Foster Intelligence, undated). It is worthy of note that Section 5 of the 
Criminal Law Act makes it an offense to cause wasteful employment of the police, and the Fire and Rescue 
Services Act makes raising a false fire alarm also unlawful. 
14 Fees for missed appointments are allowed by dentists in Scotland, but not in England. See 
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/publications/2011/01/25085008/1  and  
http://www.nhs.uk/chq/Pages/1789.aspx?CategoryID=74  According to the King’s Fund, the extension of this 
measure has public support (Galea et al. 2013). 
15 For example: Buyx (2008), Feiring (2008), Sharkey and Gillam (2010), Buyx and Prainsack (2012).  In 
addition, research funding (US) for lung cancer is considerably lower per death. See Wilson (2013) for a 
discussion. 
13 
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Public attitudes have been reported in favour16.  As well as identifying procedural problems, 
Harris (1995) argues that this would constitute double jeopardy by punishing people twice; 
once by them contracting a disease linked to their habit, and then again by refusal to treat it. It 
may look sometimes that overweight people, for example, are being prioritised minimally or 
even denied treatment, but care is always taken to defend decisions on the basis of forward 
looking considerations outside desert, that is, outcomes are poorer.17 It seems clear that in an 
increasingly litigious environment any attempt to deny treatment or to reduce its priority on 
the basis of desert would be likely to be resisted by individual patients and their advocates 
making open discussion and clear policy making key. In contrast, using positive desert as an 
acknowledged criterion for advanced priority seems less problematic to policy makers. In 
2007 the UK government made it clear that service veterans should be afforded priority for 
conditions caused by military service, whilst attempting to retain priority for clinical need 
(Donaldson 2010), and the recent strategy document from National Health Service Blood and 
Transplant (2013) recommends a national discussion about prioritising prior registered 
donors for receipt of organs (Jarvis 1995), as is already law in Israel (Lavee et al. 2010).  
 
Blaming and health care practice (ii) healthcare practitioners 
 
Blaming is more likely to be undertaken by individual health professionals, through both 
assessment and sanction. Research over many decades and in many countries has found that a 
persistent minority of nurses hold negative attitudes to groups of patients, for example to 
substance misusers (Howard and Chung 2000a, b), obese people (Poon and Tarrant 2009, 
Mold and Forbes 2013) and people who self-harm (McAllister et al.  2002, Saunders et al. 
2012). Negative attitudes may contribute to feelings of stigmatisation for example in lung 
cancer (Chambers et al. 2012) obesity (Puhl and Heuer 2009, Creel and Tillman 2011) and 
HIV (Nyblade et al. 2009). All of these conditions are to large extent caused by personal 
behaviour. Holding blaming attitudes and acting upon them is clearly identified as being 
unprofessional by the UK nursing regulator, the Nursing and Midwifery Council (NMC) 
(2008) which states in its professional code that: 
 
 You must treat people as individuals and respect their dignity  
 You must not discriminate in any way against those in your care  
 You must treat people kindly and considerately18  
(NMC 2008, p.2)19 
 
These statements appear to rule out disapproval and blame, because to do so would not 
(arguably) be respecting dignity, might result in discrimination, and would not be treating 
people kindly or considerately.  The medical code of practice in the UK deals with the issue 
of blame more directly.  
 
You must not refuse or delay treatment because you believe that a patient’s actions or 
lifestyle have contributed to their condition. 
                                                 
16 For example in the US Gollust and Lynch (2011). And see Bowling (1996). 
17 See for example http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/southern_counties/4717764.stm . And see Salih and 
Sutton (2013) for a review. 
18 Of interest is the corresponding clause in the General Medical Council document ‘Good Medical Practice’ is 
You must be polite and considerate (my italics) (GMC 2013, p. 16). 
19 Addressing the issue more directly, the previous version of the Code of conduct stated that  ‘you are 
personally accountable for ensuring that you promote and protect the interests and dignity of patients and clients 
irrespective of…lifestyle’ (NMC 20004). 
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(General Medical Council 2013, p. 19) 
 
As if to emphasise the importance this is re-stated on the following page: 
You must not unfairly discriminate against patients or colleagues by allowing your 
personal views* to affect your professional relationships or the treatment you provide 
or arrange. You should challenge colleagues if their behaviour does not comply with 
this guidance. 
(General Medical Council 2013, p.20) 
 
The * is elaborated upon in a footnote: ‘This includes your views about a patient’s or 
colleague’s lifestyle, culture or their social or economic status…’  
 
The NMC Code also requires that nurses advocate for their patients; MacDonald (2007) goes 
so far as arguing that it is a universally held moral obligation. Advocacy itself is contested 
and complex, but it is clearly connected with arguing for personal choice20. If a patient wants 
to stop smoking or lose weight then blaming him within the professional relationship is very 
unlikely to facilitate it; and if he does not want to change his behaviour, then blaming him is 
the opposite of advocating for his self-determination.  
 
But it would be a thin and ironic compassion that dissuaded health care professionals from 
unprofessional blaming simply for fear of being blamed. The injunctions from professional 
bodies cover sanction blame only, and it is possible that individual practitioners retain 
blaming assessments whilst being careful to avoid giving them outward expression. This 
behaviour complies with the letter of the codes, and yet falls short of what most people take a 
good nurse to be; an account which includes reference to character as well as acts (Sellman 
2011), requiring open-mindedness (Sellman 2003) in challenging their attitudes. A good 
nurse not only follows the Code’s injunctions against discrimination but also understands 
why she should.21 
 
An initial critical interrogation of any emotional or unconsidered response should start with 
asking what, exactly, the person has done wrong such that they are blameworthy for doing it. 
This requires detailed thinking about the nature of obligation in relation to their own and 
others’ health. Simply uncritically accepting the mantra that health is an intrinsic good to be 
prioritised and valorised above all else is insufficient and it provides a challengeable initial 
premise from which procedurally correct but nevertheless similarly criticisable conclusions 
follow, and stands in tension with a further valorised principle in healthcare, the supremacy 
of personal autonomy.  If a case can be made that a wrong act has been undertaken, 
consideration is also needed as to the extent to which it can be attributed to the agent, and 
health care professionals are in a better place than the public (or at least they should be) to 
understand the social, genetic and pathological determinants of health and behaviour.  
 
If the case of attribution can be made then it may be that the agent is blameworthy, but it does 
not follow from this that blame by any health care practitioner is justified because the 
standing of the relationship does not allow it. Patients are simply not accountable to health 
care professionals. Justified blame of sorts does contribute to close relationships as I have 
                                                 
20 See for example the NMC’s Guidance for the Care of Older People (2009). 
21 This argument is strikingly similar to Clouser and Gert’s (1990) much cited critique of ethical principlism. 
Practitioners respect autonomy because the principle tells them to but without theoretical justification, they do 
not know why they should. 
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described, but the albeit emotional and caring relationship that can characterise professional 
nursing excludes blaming attitudes. The relationships are fundamentally asymmetrical and 
blame is as illegitimate within them as it is within similarly asymmetrical but more 
hierarchical relationships between doctors and patients.  While I would consider it 
appropriate that my injured tombstoning son may apologise for his actions, any apology 
would be offered to me because I (and certain others) would be ourselves be harmed in light 
of the harm to him, but it would make no sense for him to apologise to his carers, apart 
perhaps from a cursory apology more associated with politeness rather than genuine moral 
behaviour.22 Similarly, it makes no sense, for him to seek forgiveness from the nurse for his 
actions (Allais 2008).  
 
Finally, brief mention is needed where it might be appropriate for health care staff to blame 
patients, where the wrongdoing is to them directly, when patients are violent and abusive 
towards them. Though the relationship is asymmetrical, it isn’t that asymmetrical, and it 
seems perfectly reasonable for nurses to feel the resentment that would characterise an assault 
outside professional health care. Much of the incidence and literature about violence to 
healthcare staff occurs within mental health services and accident units and here the question 
of impaired moral agency may be expected to lessen the force of the reactive attitudes. As far 
as sanction blame is concerned in addition to standard options to prosecute abusers through 
the criminal law system, the Handbook to the NHS Constitution makes it clear that though 
violent and abusive patients can be expected to be denied treatment by local policies, these 
‘should reflect that violent and abusive patients can only be denied access to NHS services if 
it is clinically appropriate to do so…’ (NHS 2013b p.88). As an example, the policy from the 
University Hospitals Birmingham NHS Trust (2012) states that denial of treatment lasts for a 
year, excludes emergency treatment, and that arrangements are made to transfer care 
elsewhere. 
 
Conclusion 
 
To deny that people cannot be held responsible for their health-effecting decisions is to deny 
that there is such a thing as responsibility for health, to say that there are no health related 
obligations.  However, obligations for individuals’ own health are best understood and 
defined within interpersonal relationships and derive their strength from mutual obligations 
within shared interests and individual versions of the good life. This must mean that the 
obligations for each of us are individual in strength and, importantly, direction. We owe 
obligations of various sorts and in varying strengths to those who share our lives, and it is to 
these companions that we owe an account, because we fail them when we fail to meet our 
obligations.  There are blameworthy acts in relation to responsibility for health and taking the 
blaming stance within and as part of interpersonal relationships may be justified if 
proportionate.  
 
This account inevitably results in inconsistency because of  variety in relationships and 
accounts of the good life, and this means that there can be no universalizable rules beloved by 
over-zealous health promoters (Fitzgerald 2001). Analysing the features of health related 
obligations and of justified blaming should explain why there is no place, in this account, for 
the notion of nurses and other health care professionals blaming patients for their health-
effecting behaviour by their attitude and/or actions. At the risk of perpetrating an ‘education 
reflex’ (Paley 2007), an appropriate response to the minority blaming attitudes and behaviour 
                                                 
22 See Smith (2005) for a detailed analysis of apology. 
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in respect of individuals deemed to have caused their own poor health and not fully deserving 
of health care is to mount an education challenge which will expose the simplistic 
‘philosophy’ of much professional health care practice which values health for itself rather as 
part of a good life chosen according to the (allegedly) overriding principle of respect for 
personal autonomy. The challenge is first to identify what, exactly, individuals are doing 
wrong by undertaking behaviour that harms their health, and the extent to which it can be 
attributed to the them.  A further examination of the nature of the relationships in professional 
health care and of the difference between justified blame and moralism will help practitioners 
to the view that the reactive emotions and their consequent blaming behaviours are built on 
nothing stronger than prejudice.  
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